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Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: 
Anti-Chinese Legislation in Gold Rush 
California 
MARK KANAZAWA 
Historical scholarship on the politics of nineteenth-century Chinese immigration 
emphasizes the interests of labor and management in the genesis of congres- 
sional legislation in 1882 that limited Chinese immigration into the United 
States. This article examines early state attempts at the exclusion of Chinese 
workers after the first major wave of Chinese immigration during the California 
Gold Rush. Opposition to exclusion occurred in California in the early 1850s 
because Chinese immigrants were important taxpayers when both the state and 
localities were experiencing major fiscal difficulties. State attempts to legislate 
exclusion were successful only after financial conditions improved in the late 
1850s. 
One of the darker aspects of nineteenth-century American history is the manner in which certain ethnic groups were treated by the 
largely white ethnic majority. Everyone knows that prior to the Civil 
War, the largely agricultural southern economy was based upon slavery, 
the ownership and forced labor of black workers abducted from Africa. 
Also well known is the systematic forced expulsion of American Indi- 
ans from their native lands attendant on westward migration and eco- 
nomic development of the vast American interior. The early experiences 
of Chinese immigrants provide a third example of how ethnic minorities 
were mistreated during this period, though with the obvious difference 
that beginning in the early 1850s, the Chinese immigrated willingly, 
even eagerly, to the United States in significant numbers. Yet once here, 
they encountered virulent discrimination and ultimately, legislative pro- 
hibitions on further immigration when Congress enacted the Chinese 
Exclusion Act in 1882. This law, subsequently renewed in 1892 and 
1902, imposed restrictions on immigration from China, including penal- 
ties of fines and possible imprisonment for the captains of ships caught 
transporting Chinese to the United States. Understanding the origins of 
Chinese exclusion sheds light both on nineteenth-century ethnic ten- 
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sions and on the experiences of subsequent immigrants who have also 
been subjected to racial discrimination, which in some cases(such as 
that of the Japanese) included exclusion. 
The reasons for exclusion of the Chinese given by historians go be- 
yond a naive story of simple racism or nativism. Many studies empha- 
size that Chinese workers competed with native workers for scarce jobs, 
generating support for exclusion among the latter.' This argument does 
not, however, easily explain why exclusion legislation did not occur for 
roughly 30 years after the first significant Chinese in-migrations. A 
more realistic interest group story also recognizes that employers de- 
sired low-wage labor, perhaps opposing exclusion because the Chinese 
were inexpensive, highly productive workers and their presence in- 
creased company profits and reduced the bargaining power of native 
workers.2 Some evidence suggests that exclusion was given impetus 
both by depressed labor market conditions in the late 1870s and by an 
increased tendency for Chinese to compete directly with white-owned 
firms.3 These explanations, based solely on the interests of labor and 
management, have dominated economic thinking on the politics of Chi- 
nese exclusion. 
The California Gold Rush provides a useful context in which to ex- 
amine the politics of exclusion. The state experienced a massive influx 
of Chinese miners in response to the discovery of gold in 1848, and 
exclusionary laws were seriously considered by the legislature from 
quite early on. Furthermore, the process of mining underwent an or- 
ganizational transformation during the 1850s, where initially mining 
was a largely transient, entrepreneurial enterprise in which miners 
were either self-employed or organized into cooperative joint stock 
companies. It was only over time that mining companies adopted an 
industrial model of miners working as wage labor. This means that 
during the initial Gold Rush years, the labor-management interest 
group model would predict representatives of mining counties to be 
largely captured by labor and thus strongly favor exclusion, because 
Chinese workers lacked an effective political voice. Nevertheless, dur- 
ing this early period we observe significant opposition to exclusion 
among miners and mining representatives in the legislature, suggesting 
other factors were operant. 
1 See, for example, Saxton, Indispensable Enemy, pp. 72-75; Mann, After the Gold Rush, pp. 
188-93; Daniels, Asian America, pp. 33-56; Marks, Precious Dust, pp. 300-01; and Takaki, 
Strangers, pp. 92, 95-99, 110-12. 
2 Chiu, Chinese Labor, pp. 129-32; Brown and Philips, "Competition," p. 63; and Daniels, 
Asian America, pp. 51-52. 
3 See Cross, History, p. 84; Takaki, Strangers, pp. 110-11; and Brown and Philips, "Competi- 
tion," p. 70. 
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One explanation for early opposition to exclusion in California, largely 
overlooked in existing scholarship, lies in the fact that the state levied taxes 
on foreign miners, which provided both the state and counties with mixed 
incentives to exclude Chinese miners.4 On the one hand, miners favored 
Chinese exclusion as a means of reducing competition for the available 
gold. On the other hand, Chinese miners contributed significantly to state 
and local tax revenues while adding relatively little demand for public ser- 
vices such as schools and hospitals, being mostly adult males. This latter 
factor was particularly salient immediately after statehood when both the 
state and localities were strapped for cash, generating significant opposition 
to exclusion. However, as financial conditions improved over time, opposi- 
tion to exclusion fell so that by 1858, the state was able to enact exclusion- 
ary legislation. Exclusion of the Chinese became politically feasible in Cali- 
fornia only after the state had managed to put its fiscal house in order. 
THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND CHINESE IMMIGRATION 
The discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in the middle fork of the 
American River in 1848 triggered a massive influx of miners into Cali- 
fornia. By 1852 a special state census reported that the non-Indian 
population of the state totaled over 250,000, of which over 47 percent 
resided in the seven most important mining counties-Calaveras, El 
Dorado, Mariposa, Nevada, Placer, Sierra, and Tuolumne.s Among 
these miners were significant numbers from foreign countries such as 
Mexico, Chile, Australia, various European countries, and of course, 
China, all of whom comprised nearly one-third of the total population in 
these seven counties. In total there were about 25,000 Chinese immi- 
grants, who would have comprised 10 percent of the total non-Indian 
population and over 35 percent of the total foreign-born population. By 
1860 the Chinese were the single largest foreign-born ethnic group in 
California and comprised from 12 to 23 percent of the population of 
various mining counties.6 
4 This foreign miners' tax appears in many historical descriptions of the early Chinese experi- 
ence in California (see, for example, Cross, History, p. 17; Chiu, Chinese Labor, pp. 10, 14, 16, 
22-23; Mann, After the Gold Rush, pp. 53-56; and McClain, In Search of Equality, pp. 12, 18- 
20), but it is typically simply provided as evidence of discrimination against Chinese and other 
foreign miners. To my knowledge, no existing studies examine its effect on propensities to ex- 
clude the Chinese, though Chan briefly mentions it as a reason the Chinese were initially toler- 
ated (see Chan, "People," p. 74). 
5 U.S. Department of Interior, Statistical View, p. 394. These figures are probably not entirely 
accurate given enormous difficulties in obtaining precise head counts, but still convey the broad 
pattern of population growth during this period. See Chan, This Bittersweet Soil, p. 42. 
6 Chan, "People," pp. 49, 73. In immigrating to the United States, many Chinese incurred sig- 
nificant amounts of debt, either to friends and relatives or to labor brokers. Cloud and Galenson, 
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Gold mining was initially performed in a highly labor-intensive man- 
ner using primitive methods such as panning, or rockers and cradles. 
Early miners worked alone or with a handful of partners, or organized 
into joint-stock companies as entrepreneurial teams.7 These mining 
methods were well suited to the limited financial resources of most 
Chinese miners. Over time, mining moved to a hierarchical industrial 
model in which Chinese (and other) workers provided wage labor to 
mining companies, when major technological advances enabled compa- 
nies to take advantage of significant economies of scale. Two in particu- 
lar were important: the invention of hydraulic mining (which required 
large amounts of water) and advances in quartz mining, both of which 
transformed mining into a much more heavily capital-intensive en- 
deavor than it had previously been. Though the precise timing of the 
move from entrepreneurial to industrial mining is not entirely clear, 
available evidence suggests widespread reliance on the industrial model 
probably did not occur until at least the late-1850s.8 
The early dominance of entrepreneurial, not industrial, mining meant 
that typically, miners or teams of miners were competing directly 
against each other for the gold in a given diggings. Under these circum- 
stances, all miners were competitive threats but foreign, and especially 
Chinese, miners bore the brunt of antagonism from native miners in part 
because it was easier to rationalize excluding them. As early as April 
1849, the San Francisco-published Daily Alta Californian was reporting 
local sentiment for excluding foreign miners from working the mines.9 
Contemporary news accounts contain many descriptions of native min- 
"Chinese Immigration and Contract Labor," describe an interesting institutional development in 
which organizations run by Chinese merchants-the so-called Chinese Six Companies-were 
organized in San Francisco and were centrally involved in the recruitment of Chinese workers, 
to many of whom they advanced funds for passage to the United States. Cloud and Galenson's 
interpretation of the precise nature of the involvement of the Chinese Six Companies has been 
challenged by McClain, "Chinese Immigration," but there seems little doubt that they played a 
major role. See also Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigration: Reply." 
7 Paul, California Gold, pp. 50-58; Cross, History, p. 12; and Saxton, Indispensable Enemy, 
p. 52. 
8 According to Chiu, the move was underway by 1852 as surface deposits near available wa- 
ter were already becoming scarce and quartz and hydraulic mining were proving to be profitable 
(Chinese Labor, p. 13). Cross seems to corroborate Chiu, but identifies the change as occurring 
in mid-decade (History, p. 25). However, Paul and Saxton have stressed the financial difficulties 
of quartz mining companies during the 1850s, and Paul has concluded that quartz mining was 
largely unimportant during the 1850s (Paul, California Gold, pp. 144-45; and Saxton, Indispen- 
sable Enemy, p. 57). Hydraulic mining was invented in 1853, but historians differ on how 
quickly it came to be adopted as common practice (see May, Origins; Paul, California Gold, p. 
155; and Greenland, Hydraulic Mining, pp. 48-50). The Alta Californian contains virtually no 
evidence that mining workers clashed with mining company management during the 1850s. See 
also Cornford, "'We All Live,'" p. 93. 
9 Alta Californian, 26 April 1849. 
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ers taking up arms against foreign miners, or combining to expel foreign 
miners from their diggings. Native miners were known to engage in in- 
timidation of local claims recorders to discourage them from recording 
foreign claims, and to use antiforeign sentiment as a "litmus test" for 
aspirants for political office.10 
Chinese miners often bore the brunt of antagonism from native min- 
ers. In 1849 native miners in Tuolumne County passed a resolution pro- 
hibiting Chinese miners from working claims. In the early 1850s, Chi- 
nese miners were the targets of vigorous anti-Chinese sentiment in 
Nevada County. In 1859 the sheriff of Shasta County requested assis- 
tance from the governor to put down an insurrection of locals attempt- 
ing to drive Chinese out of the county. Indeed, local attempts to exclude 
Chinese miners were made in various mining districts throughout the 
state, including Agua Fria, Grass Valley, Horsetown, Oregon Gulch, 
Middletown, Mormon Bar, Horse Shoe Bar, Columbia, Deer Creek, 
Rough and Ready, Wood's Creek, Foster's Bar, and Yuba River 
Camp."1 
On occasion, prohibitions against Chinese miners appeared in the by- 
laws of local mining districts. The 1856 by-laws of Columbia District in 
Tuolumne County explicitly prohibited Asiatics and South Sea Islanders 
from mining in the district.12 Similarly, the 1854 by-laws of Dutch Flat 
in Placer County, and the 1857 by-laws of Centreville and Helltown in 
Butte County, prohibited Chinese from purchasing mining claims.13 In 
other cases, district by-laws specified that only those who intended to 
become citizens could hold claims, implicitly targeting Chinese miners 
because federal law reserved the right of naturalization to "free white 
persons." The fact that mining districts were largely democratic, miner- 
operated frontier institutions confirms the importance of native miners 
as a driving force behind exclusion during this period.14 
Historians have commonly ascribed antiforeign and anti-Chinese sen- 
timents during the nineteenth century to nativist and racist tendencies, 
10 See, for example, Alta Californian, 12 June 1852. 
11 These various evidences of discrimination against Chinese miners are found in a number of 
sources. See Williams, "Chinese," pp. 65-67; Chan, This Bittersweet Soil, p. 58, and "People," 
p. 74; Mann, After the Gold Rush, pp. 55-56; and Alta Californian, 26 November 1858, 4 
March 1859. 
12 Heckendorn and Wilson, Miners, p. 9. 
'3 For the by-laws of Dutch Flat, see the Placer Herald, 18 November 1854. For the by-laws 
of Centreville and Helltown, see U.S. Department of Interior, United States Mining Laws, p. 
296. 
14 See, for example, the 1850 by-laws of Gold Mountain district, 1851 by-laws of Union 
Quartz Mountain district, U.S. Department of Interior, United States Mining Laws, pp. 331-32. 
On naturalization law, see Takaki, Strangers, p. 82; Mann, After the Gold Rush, p. 55. For more 
on the operation of the mining districts, see Shinn, Mining Camps; Umbeck, Theory; and Clay 
and Wright "Order." 
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perhaps fueled by beliefs in Manifest Destiny.15 The evidence presented 
so far suggests that during the California Gold Rush, antipathy toward 
the Chinese was driven by the simple fact that foreign miners competed 
with native miners for the scarce gold, thus lowering their productivity 
and expected income.16 Opposition to Chinese workers was rationalized 
in a number of ways, including depictions of them as virtual slaves to 
"foreign masters and foreign capitalists," and suggestions that their 
presence had various negative, and potentially dangerous, social side- 
effects without which the state would be better off.17 
ANTI-CHINESE LEGISLATION 
Partly in response to anti-Chinese popular sentiments, the state legis- 
lature enacted two broad measures that negatively impacted Chinese 
immigrants during this period. The first was a foreign miners' tax, ini- 
tially instituted in 1850 when all foreign-born miners were required to 
pay $20 per month to obtain a license to mine for gold.' The stated aim 
of this tax was to exert greater control over foreign miners while raising 
badly needed revenues for the depleted state treasury. Some historians, 
however, have argued that its true aim was to drive foreign miners from 
the mining regions.19 Evidence suggests it had precisely this effect in 
certain areas such as the Columbia and Sonora mining districts and, by 
one estimate, as many as 10,000 miners may have been driven back to 
Mexico.20 Sucheng Chan has suggested that the tax legitimized and en- 
couraged antiforeign violence in the mining regions, contributing to the 
exodus of foreign miners.21 
15 Mann, After the Gold Rush, p. 56; Rohrbough, Days, pp. 221, 228; Chan, "People," espe- 
cially pp. 75-77. 16 This effect on native wages is the theoretical prediction of a closed-economy model in 
which unskilled immigrants compete with unskilled native workers (see Friedberg and Hunt, 
"Impact," p. 28). This was an approximately accurate characterization of Gold Rush California. 
17 California, Legislature, Report of the Committee on Mines, p. 831. See also California, 
Legislature, Majority and Minority Reports, pp. 13, 15. These sentiments are found echoed in 
testimony before the state senate in the late 1870s, when popular and political support for exclu- 
sion was growing. See Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigration and Contract Labor," pp. 
35-36. 
18 "An Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and the government of Foreign Miners," 
Chapter 97, Statutes of California (1850), pp. 221-23. To place this figure in context, Paul has 
estimated that the average daily wage in the California gold mines in 1850 was about $10, but 
also that it declined dramatically over the next few years (Paul, California Gold, pp. 349-50). 
See also Margo, "Wages," p. 2. It is also likely that Chinese miners received significantly less 
than the average wage (Paul, California Gold, pp. 351-52). 
19 Morefield, Mexican Adaptation; and Peterson, "Foreign Miners' Tax." 
20 Alta Californian, 5 February 1859; History of Tuolumne County, pp. 28-29. Cornford, "We 
All Live," p. 86. 
21 Chan, "People," pp. 64-65. 
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Numerous enforcement difficulties led the legislature to repeal the 
tax in the following year.22 Revenues had fallen far short of expecta- 
tions, totaling less than $34,000.23 However, the legislature restored the 
tax in modified form in 1852, this time charging a more modest three 
dollars per month. In an attempt to improve enforcement, county sher- 
iffs were designated as tax collectors and required to post a $15,000 
bond to ensure payment. To provide an added incentive to pursue col- 
lection, counties were permitted to keep 50 percent of all revenues col- 
lected, minus collection costs.24 In 1853 the legislature raised the tax to 
four dollars per month.25 Two years later, the legislature drew a distinc- 
tion between foreigners eligible and those ineligible to become citizens, 
calling for the tax on ineligible foreigners (that is, the Chinese) to in- 
crease by $2 per month every year.26 This law was, however, repealed 
the following year, when the tax was restored to four dollars per month 
for all foreign miners.27 The foreign miners' tax comprised a major 
source of revenue to the State government for most of the period, con- 
sistently providing at least 10 percent of total state revenues from the 
early 1850s until 1864 (see Figure 1).28 
The state's experience with levying the foreign miners' tax should be 
understood within the larger context of state finances during this period. 
From the onset of statehood in 1850, the state experienced steady and 
persistent deficits, with annual expenditures far outpacing revenues. In 
the first fiscal year ending June 1850, the state collected virtually no 
revenues, while spending over $350,000. By the end of 1853 the total 
civil debt of the state exceeded two million dollars. Immigration was 
causing rapid population growth, requiring the state to spend ever- 
increasing amounts on hospitals, prisons, legislative expenses, the court 
system, and other administrative expenses. Meanwhile, the state was 
22 "An Act to repeal "An Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and the government of 
Foreign Miners," Chapter 108, Statutes of California (1851), p. 424. 23 California, Legislature, Annual Report, 1856, pp. 10-11, and Journal of the Senate, Ap- 
pendix S: Report of Mr. Green, p. 497. 24 "An Act to provide for the Protection of Foreigners, and to define their liabilities and privi- 
leges," Chapter 37, Statutes of California (1852), pp. 84-87. The original 1850 statute required 
all revenues minus collection costs to be paid into the state treasury. 
25 "An Act to provide for the Protection of Foreigners, and to define their liabilities and privi- 
leges," Chapter 44, Statutes of California (1853), pp. 62-65. 
26 "An Act to Amend 'An Act to provide for the Protection of Foreigners, and to define their 
liabilities and privileges,' passed March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and fifty-three," Chapter 
174, Statutes of California (1855), pp. 216-17. 
27 "An Act to Repeal an Act entitled 'An Act to Amend "An Act to provide for the Protection 
of Foreigners, and to Define their Liabilities and Privileges,"' passed March 30th, 1853, Ap- 
proved April 30th, 1855, and to Revise the Original Act," Chapter 119, Statutes of California 
(1856), p. 140. 
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FIGURE 1 
FOREIGN MINERS' TAX REVENUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL STATE 
REVENUES, SELECTED YEARS, 1851-1865 
Source: California Legislature, Annual Report, various years, 1851-1865. 
experiencing enormous difficulties in raising revenues to match, par- 
ticularly in the mining regions where the transient nature of early gold 
mining made it difficult to collect property and poll taxes.29 However, 
by 1857 the fiscal situation had largely stabilized due to increasing suc- 
cess in revenue collection and a major retrenchment in administrative 
expenses, and the state managed to run the smallest deficit in its brief 
history. In 1858 the state enjoyed its first-ever budget surplus, and from 
that point on the state was on reasonably firm financial footing. This 
secular improvement in the state's finances would play an important 
role in explaining political patterns of support for state policies regard- 
ing the Chinese.30 
The second measure was legislation that more directly attempted ei- 
ther to limit Chinese immigration, or eliminate it altogether. In 1852 
and 1853 the legislature enacted the commutation tax, which required 
incoming ships to post a $500 bond for each foreign passenger, ostensi- 
bly as surety against their becoming a financial burden to the state.31 In 
29 Throughout the 1850s state comptrollers regularly bemoaned the extreme difficulties asso- 
ciated with collecting taxes from the mining regions. See California, Legislature, Annual Re- 
port, 1854, p. 38; 1855, p. 32; 1857, p. 6; and 1861, pp. 5-6. 30 Figures on revenues, expenditures, and debt are found in California, Legislature, Annual 
Reports, various years 1852 to 1858. 
31 "An Act Concerning Passengers arriving in the Ports of the State of California," Chapter 
36, Statutes of California (1852), pp. 78-83; "An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'an Act Con- 
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practice, posting of this bond could be commuted by direct payment of 
anywhere from $5 to $50 per passenger, suggesting that the legislature 
was at least equally concerned with raising revenues to meet immediate 
financial needs.32 In 1855 the legislature passed a law taxing arriving 
vessels carrying persons "incompetent . . . to become citizens" of the 
United States, at the rate of $50 per head.33 This capitation tax obviously 
targeted Chinese immigrants. Then in 1858 the legislature, under pres- 
sure from mining localities, imposed a ban on Chinese immigration, with 
fines and possible imprisonment for anyone found guilty of knowingly 
transporting Chinese into the state.34 This law was, however, declared 
unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court early the following year.35 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CHINESE QUESTION 
Closer examination of the early experience of Chinese miners, how- 
ever, reveals a more complex picture than the simple anti-Chinese one 
painted above. Chinese miners did undertake a considerable amount of 
mining and much of it under reasonably peaceful circumstances. During 
the 1850s the Alta Californian contains numerous stories about Chinese 
miners working their claims diligently and without interference.36 
Though as we have seen, some mining district by-laws contained anti- 
Chinese provisions, the vast majority did not.37 Indeed, native miners 
sometimes took strong positions against mistreatment or expulsion of 
Chinese miners from their localities. In 1859, for example, a miners' 
meeting in Shasta County adopted resolutions firmly opposing expul- 
sion of Chinese miners from the county and vowing to hold accountable 
county officers who failed to uphold the law and protect the rights of 
the Chinese.38 
cerning Passengers arriving in the Ports of the State of California'," Chapter 51, Statutes of 
California (1853), pp. 71-73. 32 McClain has emphasized the distributional consequences of this tax, noting that it was 
likely that immigrants bore the brunt of the tax burden (McClain, In Search of Equality, pp. 12- 
13). I would argue in addition that an important objective of the commutation provision was 
probably simply to raise tax revenues at a time when the state was experiencing severe financial 
difficulties. 
33 "An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons who cannot become Citi- 
zens thereof," Chapter 153, Statutes of California (1855), pp. 194-95. 
34 "An Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this State,", Chap- 
ter 313, Statutes of California (1858), pp. 295-96. 
35 Alta Californian, 13 January 1859. 
36 See, for example, Alta Californian, 13 March 1854, 29 March 1854, 30 April 1854, 7 May 
1856, 5 August 1856, 15 June 1857, 8 August 1857, 13 September 1858, and 12 October 1858; 
see also Paul, California Gold, p. 130; and Rohrbough, Days, p. 228. 
37 Heckendorn and Wilson, Miners; and U.S. Department of Interior, United States Mining 
Laws. 
38 Alta Californian, 9 February 1859. 
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Given the evidence presented earlier, how do we interpret such con- 
crete expressions of support for the Chinese presence? One explanation 
is simply that a substantial segment of the population possessed (per- 
haps altruistic) desires for justice and fair play and to uphold basic hu- 
man and legal rights.39 Additional evidence, however, suggests a num- 
ber of economic factors were probably no less important. Contemporary 
accounts strongly suggest, for example, that many were concerned that 
exclusion of the Chinese could damage trade relations with China. In- 
deed, this very concern was expressed in two separate committee re- 
ports in the state assembly in 1853 and 1855.40 In addition, some op- 
posed exclusion on the grounds that the Chinese were a source of 
potentially valuable cheap labor for nonmining activities such as recla- 
mation of farmlands in the Central Valley and construction of transpor- 
tation and water delivery facilities.41 
Finally, a commonly heard argument against exclusion during the 
early Gold Rush concerned its ramifications for the public finances of 
the state and localities. Many viewed Chinese miners as an important 
source of tax revenues vital to the financial stability of both the state 
and the counties in which they resided. In 1855, the Alta Californian 
asked the rhetorical question: "Are the Chinese Injuring the State?" Its 
answer was assuredly not, that on the contrary: "Were it not for the 
taxes paid by the Chinese, the credit of nearly every mining county 
would now be verging on bankruptcy."42 
Four years later, the Auburn Herald put it even more starkly: 
Expel the Chinamen and Bankrupt the State. -We do not believe it practicable 
or desirable that the Chinamen shall be expelled . . and we assert this upon the 
well-grounded conviction that the taxes at present derived from them are a ne- 
cessity to the state; and therefore, any law that looks to their immediate expul- 
sion from the mines, at the same time aims at the immediate cutting off of large 
revenues from the several mining counties and the State government.43 
39 See, for example, Alta Californian, 9 April 1858 and 9 February 1859. It should be men- 
tioned that one may wish to take quotes from the Alta Californian as altruistic expression with a 
grain of salt, as during the 1850s the newspaper was strongly anti-union. See, for example, 
Cross, History, pp. 23-24. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
40 See California, Legislature, Majority and Minority Reports, p. 5, and Minority Report of 
the Select Committee, p. 12. For more on the importance of trade relations with China, see Ta- 
kaki, Strangers, p. 22; Daniels, Asian America, pp. 51-52; and Alta Californian, 13 January 
1859. 
41 California, Legislature, Report of Mr. Flint, p. 4. See also San Francisco Bulletin, 15 De- 
cember 1856. 
42 Alta Californian, 5 November 1855. 
43 Alta Californian, 23 February 1859. 
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Furthermore, there was a definite sense among some in the late 1850s 
that driving out the foreign miners could inflict costs on other miners by 
making it more likely that the state legislature would be forced to tax 
mining claims, which were exempt from taxation after 1857. In 1859, 
for example, the Shasta Republican argued against expelling Chinese 
miners from Shasta County: 
By a late decision, it has been declared clearly within the power of the Legisla- 
ture to pass a law taxing mining claims,.... Drive (the Chinese out), thus de- 
priving (mining counties) of the heavy revenue collected from this source and 
see how soon a necessity for such taxation will become apparent. To choose, of 
two evils, the least, has, for a long time, been considered wise, and that the exis- 
tence of such a law would be a greater evil to the mining class . .. than the pres- 
ence of 'poor John' appears to be not likely to be denied.44 
A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAXATION AND IMMIGRATION 
RESTRICTIONS 
The preceding discussion reflects a self-inflicted dilemma faced by 
the state of California during the Gold Rush. By imposing a tax on Chi- 
nese miners, the state acquired a fiscal interest in the presence of a Chi- 
nese population. This meant that any political and other costs associated 
with a Chinese presence would have to be weighed against its fiscal 
benefits. Mining counties faced a similar tradeoff after 1852, when the 
state permitted counties to keep nearly half of all foreign miners' reve- 
nues collected. 
A simple model will clarify the argument. Assume the government 
wishes to maximize political support among its relevant constituencies, 
and assume initially the absence of a foreign miners' tax. This govern- 
ment may be modeled as possessing the following objective function 
L = B(E, 1) - C(R, 1) + A[R - E] (1) 
where I is a policy regulating immigration of Chinese miners into the 
state, E is total expenditures by the government (which buy political 
support), R is total revenues (from current taxes, which inflict political 
costs), and B(o) and C(o) are political benefit and cost functions.45 
Without loss of generality, assume that I is simply the number of Chi- 
nese miners permitted to enter the state. The state enjoys benefits and 
incurs costs from the presence of Chinese miners. The benefits derive 
from a larger consumer base, cheaper labor for agriculture, or improved 
44 Alta Californian, 11 February 1859. 
45 This model is an obvious extension of the fiscal model of Wallis, Sylla, and Legler, "Inter- 
action," pp. 123-25. 
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trade relations with China, all of which generate tangible political bene- 
fits to the government. The costs derive from political opposition from 
potentially key constituencies (such as native miners). Assume both that 
aB/laI > 0 and aC/laI > 0. In this model, the government maximizes with 
respect to immigration by equating the marginal benefits and marginal 
costs, setting I at some level I*.46 
Now consider imposing a unit tax on Chinese miners, and assume 
that this tax negligibly affects how much revenue the government can 
raise from other sources. Then revenues increase to R' = R + tl. How- 
ever, this tax adds nothing to political costs because it is imposed on a 
group with no voting and little other political power. The objective 
function of the government is then 
L = B[E, I(t)] - C[R, I(t)] + A{[R + tl(t)] - E} (1') 
Now the government maximizes by simultaneously choosing t and L 
For any positive t, optimal I** exceeds original I* because the increased 
revenues permit the government to buy more political support through 
increased expenditures. Imposition of the tax generates a fiscal tradeoff 
between the stringency of the immigration policy and demand by the 
government for tax revenues. That is, when the government imposes 
this particular type of tax, it experiences political incentive to relax its 
immigration policy in order to enjoy added fiscal benefits.47 
Models 1 and 1' embody a balanced budget constraint that revenues 
must equal expenditures. Relaxing this constraint adds a choice variable 
for the government; namely, how much additional debt to assume in any 
given time period. How this extra degree of freedom affects optimal t 
and I depends upon the costs of incurring additional debt. If these costs 
are infinite, the government's problem reduces to model 1' and the gov- 
46 Being static models, neither this model nor that of Wallis, Sylla, and Legler consider dy- 
namic impacts of immigration such as long-term fiscal impacts on government revenues and 
expenditures. Economists appear to be divided on the magnitude of the long-term fiscal impact 
of immigration, at least within the context of current U.S. immigration policy. Auerbach and 
Oreopoulos, "Analyzing the Fiscal Impact," use a generational accounting model to conclude 
that the long-term fiscal impact of immigration is likely to be "extremely small." However, us- 
ing an overlapping generations model Storesletten, "Sustaining Fiscal Policy," concludes that 
the fiscal impact of low-skilled immigrants is probably low, though the same is not true of high- 
skilled immigrants in their prime working years. Because early mining required low-skilled la- 
bor, I would argue that this static model captures the first-order fiscal impacts of immigration 
that would have been considered by Gold Rush legislators. 
47 In the full-blown optimization problem, the government also selects optimal t, which has 
not been derived here as it is not necessary for the analysis. In the market for immigrants, the 
market-clearing tax will equate the government's supply of immigrant slots with immigrants' 
demand for these slots. It is mathematically possible that the market-clearing tax rate will be 
zero, in which case I* = I**. 
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ernment chooses t and I**. However, if the costs are sufficiently low, 
the option of assuming debt can become attractive. Then the fiscal ad- 
vantages of a taxable Chinese population decrease and optimal I falls, to 
I*** (< I**). Relaxing the fiscal constraint makes maintaining a Chi- 
nese population less desirable. 
The analysis so far does not distinguish among the political tradeoffs 
confronting legislators representing different constituencies. During the 
Gold Rush, the most relevant distinction for our purposes was between 
legislators representing mining interests and their nonmining counter- 
parts. In terms of the model, throughout this period representatives of 
mining interests experienced much higher political costs from support- 
ing Chinese immigration than did nonmining representatives. However, 
they would have reaped more political benefits in terms of local tax 
revenues after 1852, when counties began to keep half of the revenues 
from the foreign miners' tax. The model thus yields an ambiguous pre- 
diction regarding the relative levels of support for exclusion among 
mining versus nonmining representatives. As financial conditions im- 
proved over time, however, the relative tax benefits to mining represen- 
tatives of supporting immigration declined and concomitantly, one 
would predict greater support for exclusion. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CHINESE 
EXCLUSION POLICIES IN GOLD RUSH CA 
The Legislative Arguments Regarding Exclusion 
The issue of exclusion was brought before the legislature in 1852 
when Governor Bigler called on the legislature to "check this tide of 
Asiatic immigration" and keep them from taking gold out of the coun- 
try.48 Bigler proposed a tax on Chinese immigrants and called on Con- 
gress to prohibit Chinese contract labor from entering the country to 
mine for gold. The assembly referred the matter to its mining- 
dominated Committee on Mines and Mining Interests, which recom- 
mended "passage of a law which shall prevent our mines from being 
overrun by (the Chinese)," while supporting reinstatement of the foreign 
miners' tax, though at a lower level than previously.49 A senate special 
committee dominated by nonmining interests, however, recommended 
48 California, Legislature, Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate, p. 373. 
49 California, Legislature, Report of the Committee on Mines, p. 831. In 1852 the seven mem- 
bers of the assembly Committee on Mines and Mining Interests represented Yuba, El Dorado, 
Placer, Mariposa, Calaveras, Nevada, and Tuolumne Counties, mining counties all. 
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the Chinese be expelled from the mines.50 The fact that the mining in- 
terest-dominated assembly committee recommended not expulsion but 
rather, a tax, strongly suggests that its members believed that mining 
counties had a financial interest in retaining their populations of foreign 
miners. It is also telling that the largely non-mining-dominated senate 
committee favored expulsion from the mines but not from the state.51 
In the following 1853 session, a bill was introduced in the assembly 
permitting Chinese miners to be involuntarily ejected from their claims 
"by citizen miners ... desirous and prepared to work (the claims) im- 
mediately," upon payment of the value of any improvements made.52 
This bill was reported on unfavorably by the Committee on Mines and 
Mining Interests, still heavily dominated by mining interests, which in- 
stead recommended that the foreign miners' license fee be increased 
from $3 to $4. The Committee was, however, deeply divided on the is- 
sue of exclusion, which generated a majority and two minority reports. 
The majority report contained a spirited defense of Chinese immigra- 
tion, arguing that it bolstered expanded trade with China and that even 
the threat of exclusion had already damaged trade relations with China. 
This report added that exclusion of foreign miners was likely to damage 
the state financially: "If we exclude Chinamen and other foreigners 
from the mines of California, we lose an important part of the source 
from whence we might derive our revenue."53 
Two members of the Committee, however, submitted a fierce rebuttal 
to the majority view, in which they argued strenuously for permitting 
mining localities to exclude Chinese from mining. In doing so, they 
downplayed the importance of trade with China and focused instead on 
the negative effects of Chinese immigration on "the free white labor of 
our State."54 They proposed adding the following provision to the stat- 
ute modifying the foreign miners' license fee: 
Section 18: The provisions of this Act shall not be so construed as to prevent the 
Miners in any mining district from adopting and enforcing rules and regulations 
preventing foreigners, who, on account of their color, are ineligible to the rights 
of citizenship from working the mines in said mining district.55 
50 Report of Committee on the Governor's Special Message, pp. 736-37. Only one member of 
this committee represented a mining county(Placer), the others represented Napa/Solano, San 
Diego, San Francisco, and Sacramento. 
5 The senate report suggests that its members were concerned about the effect wholesale ex- 
pulsion might have on trade relations with China. See California, Legislature, Report of Com- 
mittee on the Governor's Special Message, p. 736. 
52 California, Legislature, Majority and Minority Reports, p. 4. 
53 Ibid., pp. 5, 20-21. 
54 California, Legislature, Majority and Minority Reports, p. 14. 
55 Ibid., p. 13. 
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This provision, which targeted Chinese miners, was narrowly de- 
feated in the assembly in a 26 to 25 vote in which a majority of the 
representatives from mining counties voted against it. Another provi- 
sion that would have simply prohibited Chinese from working in the 
mines was overwhelmingly defeated 31 to 10, with mining representa- 
tives opposed by a three-to-one margin.56 Taken together, these votes 
suggest that broadly speaking, in 1853 miners desired self-rule and the 
right to make their own decisions, but did not favor exclusion of Chi- 
nese miners. 
Within two years, however, continued Chinese immigration had re- 
sulted in greater pressure on the state legislature to enact exclusionary 
legislation.57 In early March of 1855 three separate bills were intro- 
duced in the assembly that would have prohibited Chinese from mining. 
These were all referred to a select committee dominated by mining rep- 
resentatives that reported back a bill embracing this exclusionary prin- 
ciple. In fact, the committee report went further, arguing that as a matter 
of constitutional law, the state had the right to expel the Chinese from 
the state altogether.58 The report also downplayed the contention of the 
previous committee on the importance of liberal immigration policy in 
encouraging and supporting Chinese trade. All of which strongly sug- 
gests that the attitudes of mining interests regarding exclusion had 
changed dramatically since 1853. It should also be noted that a motion 
in the assembly to kill the bill was handily defeated, 51 to 14, as repre- 
sentatives from mining counties voted overwhelmingly against killing 
the bill by a better than six-to-one margin. 
It is worth mentioning that S. B. Stevens, an assemblyman from 
Calaveras County, an important mining county, authored a minority re- 
port that strongly opposed excluding the Chinese from mining. Stevens 
emphasized the importance of Asian trade and the likely negative effect 
of exclusion on that trade. However, he also expressed concerns that 
lost tax revenues from exclusion of Chinese miners would likely force 
the state to raise taxes on other miners.59 In interpreting this report, two 
facts are important to keep in mind. First, Calaveras County had one of 
the largest foreign-born populations of any county in the state, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of total county population, meaning 
that the local loss of tax revenues from exclusion would likely have 
been considerable.60 Second, whereas Stevens voted to kill the exclu- 
56 California, Legislature, Journal of the Assembly, 3rd session, pp. 287-88. 
57 See, for example, Mann(1982), p. 62; McClain(1994), pp. 17-18. 
58 California, Legislature, Reports of the Select Committee, p. 6. 
59 California, Legislature, Minority Report of the Select Committee, p. 12. 
60 According to the 1852 census, over half of the population of Calaveras County was for- 
eign-born, second in the state only to San Francisco County. 
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sion bill, the other two representatives from Calaveras County did not. 
This intracounty split suggests strong local ambivalence about the de- 
sirability of exclusion in a heavily mining-dependent region. 
In any case, exclusion of the Chinese from mining never became law, 
as this bill was superceded by another one calling for the capitation tax 
referred to earlier that taxed incoming vessels $50 for every Chinese 
immigrant brought into the state. In enacting this tax, the legislature was 
drawing a key distinction between new Chinese immigrants and Chi- 
nese already present in the state. The senate committee that recom- 
mended this capitation tax downplayed its possible negative effect on 
trade relations with China. It was, however, highly ambivalent about 
expelling the existing Chinese population from the mines, arguing that 
the expulsion would cause problems elsewhere as the displaced Chinese 
miners flooded into cities and agricultural areas. Also important in the 
committee's view, however, was the negative impact such expulsion 
would have on the local finances of the mining counties: 
Another consideration, entitled to some weight in the estimation of your Com- 
mittee, arises from the fact, that one-half of the nett(sic) proceeds of this foreign 
miners' tax, is paid into the various county treasuries of the counties in which it 
is collected, and to abruptly take that source of revenue away from them, while 
many of them have heavy debts hanging over them, would be doing them injus- 
tice, and create a necessity for a very great increase of taxation, which would be 
burdensome upon their citizens.61 
Given this fiscal reality, the committee argued that it would be better 
to allow the Chinese to remain until counties had their fiscal houses in 
order. 
The capitation tax turned out to be highly controversial, and by the 
next year the assembly had received a number of petitions requesting 
reduction of the tax, which were referred to its Committee on Mines and 
Mining Interests. The Committee report recommended keeping the 
capitation tax and advanced an extensive legal and philosophical de- 
fense of the right of the state to exclude anyone it chooses, if in the best 
interests of the state. In response to arguments that Chinese immigration 
provided financial and commercial benefits to the state, it loftily re- 
torted that "in a question of this kind we must be governed by consid- 
erations of a higher character than dollars and cents."62 The legislature 
followed its recommendation and retained the capitation tax. The report 
did not explicitly address the possible effect of Chinese exclusion on tax 
revenues but did recommend that the action of the previous legislative 
61 California, Legislature, Report ofMr. Flint, p. 6. 
62 California, Legislature, Report of Committee on Mines and Mining Interests (1856), p. 11. 
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session to increase the foreign miners' license fee be overturned and 
that it be restored to its $4 per month level. This suggests that it be- 
lieved that the previously higher fee levels were having a negative ef- 
fect on tax revenues, perhaps by discouraging Chinese from mining. 
Finally, in 1858 the legislature passed a law prohibiting Chinese im- 
migration and calling for fines and possible imprisonment for anyone 
found guilty of transporting Chinese workers into the state.63 This bill 
was passed in the assembly 50 to 21, with representatives of the most 
heavily mining counties virtually unanimous in favor, while others were 
evenly split. In securing passage, an amendment was defeated that 
would have exempted eight southern and coastal counties from its op- 
eration. This amendment enjoyed unanimous support of the representa- 
tives of those eight exempted counties, indicating they fully expected to 
enjoy significant benefits from continued immigration of the Chinese. It 
should be mentioned that each of these eight counties had a relatively 
light foreign presence, with foreigners comprising less than 10 percent 
of the county population, well below the state average. The bill then 
went to the senate, where it passed by a narrower margin, 15 to 10, 
again with strong support from mining representatives. 
Analysis of Exclusion Legislation 
The preceding discussion indicates that legislative support for Chi- 
nese exclusion increased between the early- and late-1850s and also 
strongly suggests that legislative concerns regarding the impact on the 
financial condition of mining counties may have tempered opposition to 
exclusion. I now provide more systematic evidence that corroborates 
this temporal trend in support for exclusion and also links local finan- 
cial conditions to patterns of support for exclusion. 
Consider first the patterns of support for Chinese exclusion in several 
key roll call votes in the assembly and senate in 1853 and 1858. The 
1853 votes, both in the assembly, concern the two measures mentioned 
earlier that would have made it easier to exclude the Chinese from min- 
ing. The first is the proposed Section 18 that would have allowed min- 
ing districts to enact rules to exclude Chinese miners. The second bill 
would have prohibited Chinese from mining entirely. The 1858 votes 
are the senate and assembly votes to prohibit Chinese immigration to 
the state. Table 1 reports the votes on these measures among representa- 
tives of the 12 counties where mining was occurring in significant 
amounts. In columns 1 and 2, "Yes" votes are votes to strike or weaken 
63 "An Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this State." Chap- 
ter 313, Statutes of California (1858), pp. 295--96. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY, ROLL-CALL VOTES ON 1853, 1858 VOTES 
Value of Gold 1853 1858 
Production as a 
Percentage of Total (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Manufacturing Value, VOTE 1 VOTE2 Senate Assembly 
1860 
County Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Mariposa 0.987 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 
Nevada 0.880 2 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 
Tuolumne 0.852 2 2 1 3 2 0 4 0 
Sierra 0.830 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 
Calaveras 0.775 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 
Amador 0.726 1 0 2 0 
Trinity 0.706 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Tulare 0.659 0 0 1 0 
Placer 0.610 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 1 
Siskiyou 0.582 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Plumas 0.395 1 0 2 0 
El Dorado 0.295 1 3 1 1 4 0 6 0 
Subtotals 
Mining Counties 12 8 12 4 14 0 30 1 
All Others 14 17 19 6 1 10 20 20 
Total 26 25 31 10 15 10 50 21 
Notes: VOTEl: To strike Section 18, substitute that Collector receives 27 percent, Recorder re- 
ceives 3 percent, of all foreign miners' license fee revenues raised in county. VOTE2: To reject 
substitute that prohibits persons ineligible for citizenship from working in the mines. 1858: To 
exclude Chinese from immigrating to the state. 
exclusion in 1853. No clear pattern is apparent besides the general, 
largely across-the-board opposition of mining representatives to exclud- 
ing the Chinese from mining.64 Columns 3 and 4, however, indicate that 
by 1858, the attitudes of mining representatives had changed dramati- 
cally to virtual unanimity in favor of exclusion, this time from the state 
entirely. Had this shift not occurred, exclusion would likely not have 
been enacted in 1858 because nonmining assemblymen were dead- 
locked on, while nonmining senators were virtually unanimous against, 
exclusion. 
A simple econometric analysis helps to understand legislative atti- 
tudes toward Chinese exclusion and why these changed over time. The 
basic model, applied to both the 1853 and 1858 votes, assumes that leg- 
islative support for exclusion was potentially influenced by the extent of 
the Chinese presence, the importance of mining, financial conditions, 
and stakes in the Chinese trade, all on the local level. The basic model 
is then 
64 For the votes on VOTE] and VOTE2, see California, Legislature, Journal of the Assembly, 
3rd session, pp. 287-88. 
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PROB =f(CHINESE, MINING, FINANCIAL, TRADESTAKES) (2) 
where PROB is the probability of voting for exclusion. 
For the econometric analysis of the 1853 measures, VOTE] and 
VOTE2 are pooled to conserve degrees of freedom, thus providing 91 
observations. The dependent variable, VOTE53, equals one if a repre- 
sentative voted "Yes" on a given vote and equals zero if the representa- 
tive voted "No." In all cases, therefore, a "Yes" vote may be interpreted 
as a vote against exclusion. The Chinese presence is captured by the 
variable FOREIGN, defined as the total number of foreign-born male 
residents in a county as a percentage of total county population, based 
on figures in the 1852 census.65 The local importance of mining is cap- 
tured by the variable MINING%, defined as total value of mining pro- 
duction within a county as a percentage of total manufacturing value in 
1860, the nearest census year for which manufacturing and mining val- 
ues are available.66 Stakes in the Chinese trade are captured by a 
dummy variable SANFRANCISCO that equals one if the legislator 
represents San Francisco and zero if not. This variable captures trade 
stakes imperfectly as other areas of the state also had a stake in Chinese 
trade, but there is little doubt that San Francisco occupied a unique posi- 
tion in terms of expectations of trade benefits. 
Comprehensive, consistent information on local financial conditions 
during this early period is difficult to obtain. We do know, however, the 
identities of those counties that had incurred debt by 1853 because such 
debt had to be authorized by special acts of the legislature.67 Prior to 
1853 six counties, all mining counties, had been authorized by the legis- 
lature to float bond issues: Calaveras, El Dorado, Nevada, Placer, Si- 
erra, and Siskiyou. To capture the financial condition of a county, the 
dummy variable DEBT equals one if a county had been authorized by 
the legislature to float a bond issue prior to 1853 and equals zero if not. 
A final factor to consider is north-south sectional differences that 
may have affected voting behavior in the assembly. Histories and con- 
temporary accounts have described strong differences over taxation be- 
tween mining counties and counties in the southern part of the state. 
Southern counties complained of having to pay more than their share of 
property taxes because the gold mines were situated on federal public 
65 U.S. Department of the Interior, Statistical View, p. 394. This variable obviously overstates 
the total number of Chinese residents. Total foreign residents is used because comprehensive 
county-level data on Chinese residents are not available. 
66 U.S. Department of the Interior, Census of Manufactures, pp. 23-36. 
67 Beginning in 1852, such county-level funding acts were enacted every year by the legisla- 
ture for at least the next six years. 
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lands, which were not subject to property tax.68 This dispute over taxes 
regularly arose during the 1850s and was serious enough that by the eve 
of the Civil War, several southern counties favored breaking off from 
the rest of the state.69 If foreign miners were contributing importantly to 
tax revenues, southern counties may have opposed excluding them from 
mining. To capture these sectional differences, I created a dummy vari- 
able SOUTH that equals one for southern counties and equals zero for 
all other counties.70 
Assuming a logit specification, the estimations are performed on the 
following model 
ln[P/(1 - P)] = PO + /il FOREIGN + 
/12 (DEBT X FOREIGN) + /13 MINING% + 
,f4 (DEBT X MINING%) + f/5 SOUTH + 
*j6 SANFRANCISCO + 17 VOTEDUMMY + u (3) 
where P is the probability of a "Yes" vote and VOTEDUMMY equals 
zero if the vote is on VOTE] and equals one if on VOTE2. There are 
several important things to notice about this specification. First, the in- 
teraction term between DEBT and FOREIGN permits the effect of a 
greater foreign presence on opposition to exclusion to differ between 
indebted and non-indebted counties. Recalling that only mining coun- 
ties had incurred debt by this time, mining counties with no debt may 
favor exclusion because Chinese miners competed with native miners 
for the gold, but their indebted counterparts may not because of greater 
concerns for lost tax revenues. Similarly, the interaction term between 
DEBT and MINING% permits support for exclusion in more heavily 
mining counties also to be tempered by the presence of debt.71 Finally, 
the inclusion of VOTEDUMMY permits the probability of opposition to 
exclusion to differ depending upon the stringency of the exclusion 
measure the vote would allow. 
The results of logit estimations of model 3 are reported in Table 2. 
The problem arose that (DEBTXFOREIGN) and (DEBTXMINING%) 
68 See Ellison, Self-Governing Dominion, pp. 66-67; and California, Legislature, Journal of 
the Assembly, 3rd session, pp. 12-13. 
69 See, for example, Ellison, Self-Governing Dominion, pp. 167-91; and Caughey, California, 
pp. 336-37. 
70 The southern counties are Fresno, Los Angeles, Monterey, San Bernardino, San Diego, San 
Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz. 
71 It should be noted that the theoretical effect of MINING% on support for exclusion is am- 
biguous. In the absence of debt considerations, support for exclusion among native miners 
would have depended upon how intensely they competed for gold with Chinese miners. Such 
competition could have been more or less intense in more heavily mining-intensive counties. 
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TABLE 2
LOGIT ESTIMATIONS OF ANTI-EXCLUSION VOTES IN 1853 ASSEMBLY 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.03 0.11 -0.13 -0.06 
(0.52) (0.50) (0.52) (0.51) 
FOREIGN -3.68* -2.11 -3.03 -1.82 
(2.17) (1.83) (2.15) (1.78) 
(DEBT X FOREIGN) 3.79* 4.47** 
(2.16) (2.15) 
MINING% 1.45 1.09 
(1.01) - (1.04) 
(DEB TX MINING%) 2.42** 2.76** 
(1.19) (1.13) 
SANFRANCISCO 2.00* 1.13 1.80* 1.17 
(1.06) (0.86) (1.05) (0.85) 
VOTEDUMMY 1.10** 1.12** 1.13** 1.15** 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
SOUTH 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.17 
(0.69) (0.66) (0.69) (0.68) 
Log likelihood -53.69 -54.79 -53.09 -53.66 
Percentage correct 0.626 0.637 0.626 0.615 
* = Significant at the 90-percent level. 
** = Significant at the 95-percent level. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are estimated standard errors. N = 91. 
were highly multicollinear, so that both variables were highly insignifi- 
cant when included simultaneously. I therefore report the results of es- 
timations with each included separately. The striking result is that debt 
seems to matter. Regarding the presence of foreigners, the results pro- 
vide weak evidence that a greater foreign presence in nonindebted 
counties increases support for exclusion (/l < 0), but columns 1 and 2 
reveal that the same was not true among indebted counties (1l + 62 is 
not significantly different from zero). In columns 3 and 4, among non- 
indebted counties opposition to exclusion is essentially unchanged as 
the local economy becomes more mining-intensive (,f3 not signifi- 
cantly different from zero). However, among indebted counties, oppo- 
sition to exclusion increased with mining intensity 
(,#4 
> 0). These 
findings reflect both that the costs of exclusion in terms of foregone 
tax revenues were higher for indebted counties and that these costs in- 
creased as these counties relied more heavily on mining in their local 
economies. 
Finally, the result on SOUTH (,85 insignificant) indicates no system- 
atic opposition to exclusion by southern interests. Because there is am- 
ple evidence that southern counties were aware that they were bearing a 
disproportionate share of state taxes even at this early stage, one possi- 
ble interpretation is that they did not perceive the presence of foreign 
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miners to be a contributing factor.72 The fact that the coefficient on 
SANFRANCISCO is borderline significant provides weak evidence that 
trade interests opposed exclusion of the Chinese from mining. This 
variable is, however, an imprecise proxy for the stakes of California 
merchants in the Chinese trade, which may also explain its relative lack 
of significance. It is also impossible to dismiss other hypotheses, such 
as the concerns expressed by the 1853 senate committee that exclusion 
from the mines might lead to massive relocations of Chinese to other 
areas of the state, including cities such as San Francisco. 
To understand how and why legislative attitudes towards the Chinese 
presence apparently changed by 1858, I now turn to the roll-call vote in 
the assembly on passage of the 1858 exclusion act. The dependent vari- 
able here is VOTE58, equal to one if a representative voted "Yes" and 
equal to zero if the representative voted "No." The basic model is the 
same, though with a few subtle differences. First, improved census data 
in 1860 permit me to capture the Chinese presence with the actual num- 
ber of Chinese, not foreign, residents. The variable is CHINESE, de- 
fined as the number of Chinese as a percentage of the total population 
of a county in 1860.73 
As before, support for exclusion is potentially influenced by stakes in 
the Chinese trade, the local importance of mining, and local indebted- 
ness, which are again captured by SANFRANCISCO, MINING% and 
DEBT. In addition, I control for a structural change that occurred in 
1856. The debt that had accumulated in the early 1850s occurred despite 
a constitutional provision limiting state debt to no more than $300,000 
in total.74 The state's growing indebtedness was eventually challenged 
in court and in 1856 the state supreme court, in People v. Johnson, de- 
clared this debt unconstitutional in overturning a statute that called for 
the state to take on more debt to build a wagon road.75 By calling a halt 
to increased state debt, People may have raised the expectation that re- 
duced revenues resulting from exclusion would be reflected in reduced 
state expenditures rather than increased state debt.76 Thus, localities that 
stood to lose the most from reduced expenditures may have opposed 
exclusion. To allow for this possibility, I created the variable 
SCHOOLEXP, defined as total expenditure by the state on schools in 
72 Annual Message of the Governor, California, Legislature, Journal of the Assembly, 3rd ses- 
sion, p. 13. See also Ellison, Self-Governing Dominion, pp. 174-75. 
73 U.S. Department of the Interior, Census of 1860, p. 28. 
74 Statutes of California (1850); and Constitution of the State of California, Appendix, p. IX. 
75 6 Cal 499(1856). See also Nougues v. Douglass 7 Cal 65(1857), in which the Court struck 
down a statute calling for construction of a new State capitol. 
76 Recall that in my model, a tightening of the balanced-budget constraint increased the short- 
term benefits of immigration by permitting the state to maintain or increase expenditures. 
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the county represented by a legislator in 1858. School expenditures 
were by far the largest and most important component of county-level 
state spending that is available from public documents. The assumption 
is that counties enjoying the largest state expenditures on schools could 
potentially be hurt the most by the loss of tax revenues attendant on 
Chinese exclusion, in which case the coefficient on SCHOOLEXP is 
predicted to be negative. 
Again assuming a logit specification, the model I estimate here is 
ln[P/(1 - P)] = fO + /ll CHINESE + 
f12 (DEBT X CHINESE) + fl3 MINING% + 
f14 (DEBTX MINING%) + /35 SCHOOLEXP + 
f16 SOUTH + /P7 SANFRANCISCO + u (4) 
This model is virtually identical to model 3, except for the addition of 
SCHOOLEXP and the omission of VOTEDUMMY, which is now un- 
necessary. The results of a series of estimations are reported in Table 3. 
The most striking result is the highly significant negative coefficient on 
SCHOOLEXP, which indicates that localities with greater stakes in the 
state budget more strongly opposed exclusion, even when we control 
for the amount of local indebtedness. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that exclusion was perceived to have adverse financial im- 
plications for localities, operating through the state budget. The fact that 
the model performs noticeably worse when SCHOOLEXP is excluded 
confirms its importance, and the fact that the other coefficients in the 
model do not improve in significance indicates that their lack of signifi- 
cance is not due to collinearity with SCHOOLEXP. The findings on the 
coefficient on CHINESE suggest that support for exclusion was moder- 
ately stronger where the Chinese presence was greater, as predicted. 
The relative insignificance of this coefficient when MINING% and 
(DEBT X CHINESE) are included in part reflects significant multicol- 
linearity among these variables." The negative coefficient on SOUTH 
indicates the definite presence of the north-south rift described in the 
histories. The positive coefficient on SANFRANCISCO indicates that by 
1858, any additional stakes in the Chinese trade enjoyed by the city 
were now more than outweighed by other factors, such as competition 
with urban labor. Again, given that this variable is an imprecise proxy 
for stakes in the Chinese trade, interpretation of this result is somewhat 
problematic. 
77The correlation coefficient between CHINESE and MINING% is 0.54, and between 
CHINESE and (DEBT X CHINESE) is 0.80. 
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TABLE 3
LOGIT ESTIMATIONS OF EXCLUSION VOTE IN 1858 ASSEMBLY 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 1.21 1.23 1.38* 1.39* -0.13 
(0.86) (0.85) (0.81) (0.81) (0.61) 
CHINESE 0.45 0.48 0.17* 0.19** 0.40 
(0.61) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09) (0.46) 
(DEBTX CHINESE) -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 
(0.59) (0.53) - (0.44) 
MINING% 1.46 2.13 1.71 
(2.11) (4.65) (1.71) 
(DEBT X MINING%) --0.67 1.14 
(4.74) (2.09) 
SCHOOLEXP -0.62*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
SOUTH -1.98* -1.80* -2.15* -2.07* -1.46 
(1.15) (1.09) (1.12) (1.11) (1.03) 
SANFRANCISCO 5.03* 5.77** 4.98* 5.16* 1.65 
(2.87) (2.70) (2.82) (2.78) (1.14) 
Log likelihood -23.00 -23.26 -23.21 -23.35 -27.17 
Percentage correct 0.871 0.857 0.871 0.871 0.771 
* = Significant at the 90-percent level. 
** = Significant at 95-percent level. 
*** = Significant at 99-percent level. 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are estimated standard errors. N= 70. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the coefficient on MINING% is totally 
insignificant. This relatively weak finding may reflect the fact that as 
we saw earlier, by 1858 mining had become more of a capital-intensive 
industrial endeavor where miners worked for companies under wage 
contracts. Consequently, support for exclusion among mining workers 
who competed with Chinese immigrants for access to gold may have 
been counterbalanced by opposition to exclusion among mining compa- 
nies, who desired larger pools of cheaper labor. This finding is consis- 
tent with historians who have argued that employers provided a coun- 
terweight to the demands of labor to exclude the Chinese. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The early experiences of Chinese immigrants in Gold Rush Califor- 
nia were shaped by a complex set of economic factors that centered on 
their new role as participants in the labor market for the burgeoning 
mining industry. No doubt native miners perceived the Chinese to be a 
competitive threat and engaged in various discriminatory practices de- 
signed to extract greater rents from the available gold. The perceived 
threat posed by the Chinese gave rise to observable public support for 
exclusion as early as 1852. During the early 1850s, however, political 
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support for exclusion was mitigated by several factors including possi- 
ble altruistic concerns for the rights of the Chinese, mercantile con- 
cerns that trade with China might be damaged, demands for cheap la- 
bor for nonmining endeavors such as agriculture, and the fact that 
Chinese miners were contributing significant amounts of tax revenues 
to both the state and mining counties when both were experiencing 
major fiscal difficulties. These factors combined to forestall exclusion 
for several years. By the end of the 1850s, however, continued Chi- 
nese immigration and gradual improvement in the state's finances led 
tax interests to favor more restrictive exclusionary policies. Even then, 
the fiscal consequences of exclusion were a definite source of concern, 
though they were not sufficient to defeat exclusion legislation. There- 
after, the intervention of the courts was necessary to ensure continued 
Chinese immigration. 
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